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Pathological gambling is one manifestation of impulse control disorders. The biological
underpinnings of these disorders remain elusive and treatment is far from ideal. Animal
models of impulse control disorders are a critical research tool for understanding
this condition and for medication development. Modeling such complex behaviors is
daunting, but by its deconstruction, scientists have recapitulated in animals critical
aspects of gambling. One aspect of gambling is cost/benefit decision-making wherein one
weighs the anticipated costs and expected benefits of a course of action. Risk/reward,
delay-based and effort-based decision-making all represent cost/benefit choices. These
features are studied in humans and have been translated to animal protocols to measure
decision-making processes. Traditionally, the positive reinforcer used in animal studies is
food. Here, we describe how intracranial self-stimulation can be used for cost/benefit
decision-making tasks and overview our recent studies showing how pharmacological
therapies alter these behaviors in laboratory rats. We propose that these models may
have value in screening new compounds for the ability to promote and prevent aspects of
gambling behavior.
Keywords: cost/benefit decision-making, discounting, effort-based decision-making, gambling, intracranial self-
stimulation
INTRODUCTION
Problem or maladaptive gambling, including the extreme condi-
tion termed pathological gambling, is characterized by behaviors
that often persist over extended periods. Problem gambling can
have a significant negative impact on personal, professional and
financial well-being. In the last two decades, gambling opportu-
nities have increased through changes in legislation and the intro-
duction of new venues (e.g., internet gambling). Accordingly, the
prevalence of problem gambling has been on the rise. There are
no FDA-approved treatments for this disorder, and thus, it is
critical to better understand these behaviors in order to develop
efficacious therapies.
Problem gambling is a complex phenomenon, which includes
increased levels of impulsive decision-making (Alessi and Petry,
2003; Dixon et al., 2003; Holt et al., 2003; Kraplin et al., 2014)
that stem from disadvantageous evaluations of cost/benefits.
Clinical assessments of decision-making, which often employ sur-
vey and interactive computer-based tools, have been instrumental
in determining suboptimal decision-making profiles in vari-
ous pathologies including pathological gamblers (Ledgerwood
et al., 2009; Madden et al., 2009; Michalczuk et al., 2011;
Petry, 2011; Miedl et al., 2012). Clinical assessments are fre-
quently made based on three differing, albeit overlapping,
aspects of cost/benefit decision-making, including the follow-
ing: (i) the amount of risk in obtaining a reward (risk/reward
decision-making), (ii) a delay experienced before reward deliv-
ery (delay-based decision-making), and (iii) the amount of effort
required to obtain a reward (effort-based decision-making).
Several tasks have been developed to measure these critical fea-
tures of suboptimal decision-making to further understand pro-
cesses that comprise problem gambling. In these tasks, the subject
chooses between a small and large reward, each associated with
specific response contingencies. In risk/reward decision-making
(i.e., probability discounting), subjects choose between a small
reward delivered consistently at high probabilities (e.g., 100%
probability of receiving $10) and a large reward delivered at vary-
ing probabilities (e.g., 10–80% probability of receiving $100).
In clinical and preclinical studies, the absence of an expected
reward is an aversive event which elicits corresponding physio-
logical responses (Douglas and Parry, 1994; Papini and Dudley,
1997). Preference for the larger, “risky” option over the small,
certain option is considered to reflect suboptimal risk/reward
decision-making, and has been reported for several human
pathologies that display enhanced impulsivity (Reynolds et al.,
2004; Rasmussen et al., 2010; Dai et al., 2013). In delay-based
decision-making (i.e., delay discounting, a measure of impulsive
choice), the small reward is delivered soon after the option is
selected, whereas the large reward is delivered following a vari-
able delay, (e.g., $10 now or $100 in 2 weeks). Individuals who
exhibit high impulsivity demonstrate preference for immediately
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available rewards (even if smaller), over delayed rewards (even
if larger) although the latter option may be more beneficial to
the individual (Crean et al., 2000; Reynolds et al., 2004; Bickel
et al., 2012). In effort-based decision-making, the subject chooses
between a small reward delivered following small amounts of
effort, or a large reward delivered after a greater amount of effort
has been exerted. In this task, individual preference for the high
effort/large reward option and the “point” at which the individ-
ual switches to the low effort/small reward option is determined.
Studies of effort-based decision-making in human gamblers have
yet to be conducted, but would be of significant interest to assess
cognitive function in this population.
Decision-making protocols used in clinical assessments can
be modified to study decision-making in laboratory rats, and
these models are critical for exploring the behavioral and neu-
ropharmacological aspects of pathological gambling. In rats,
decision-making can be assessed by placing the animal in an oper-
ant conditioning chamber, and allowing the animal to choose
between two levers (or two nose-poke hoppers) that are made
available at the same time. The established reward modality for
the positive reinforcer in these rodent tasks is food (Stopper and
Floresco, 2011; Eubig et al., 2014).We discuss here a novel method
used in our laboratory which employs direct electrical stimulation
of brain reward pathways (intracranial self-stimulation; ICSS)
to assess cost/benefit decision-making in rats and the contri-
bution of monoaminergic neurotransmitters in decision-making
(Rokosik and Napier, 2011, 2012; Tedford et al., 2012; Persons
et al., 2013).
INTRACRANIAL SELF-STIMULATION
An operant reinforcer is a stimulus, which when made depen-
dent upon some action, increases the likelihood of the recurrence
of that action. Intracranial self-stimulation (ICSS) is an operant
behavior in which animals self-administer electrical stimulation
to brain regions known to be involved in positive reinforce-
ment. ICSS was first studied in the 1950s when James Olds and
Peter Milner (Olds and Milner, 1954) determined that rats would
repeatedly return to a location in a box where they received elec-
trical stimulation to reward-related regions in the brain. They
allowed rats to work for this electrical brain stimulation (EBS) by
responding on an operant manipulandum (e.g., pressing a lever,
spinning a wheel) (Olds and Milner, 1954). The discovery of this
technique has been instrumental in mapping reward pathways
throughout the brain, and while there are many regions of the
brain that can be used to support ICSS (Olds and Milner, 1954;
Wise and Bozarth, 1981; Wise, 1996), it is well-documented that
stimulation of the medial forebrain bundle (MFB) promotes pro-
found and reliable behavioral outputs (Corbett and Wise, 1980;
Pirch et al., 1981; McCown et al., 1986; Tehovnik and Sommer,
1997). Stimulation current parameters can be manipulated to
affect the reinforcing value of the EBS and therefore alter ICSS
behavior. These parameters include the intensity (i.e., amperes)
of the electrical current and the current frequency (i.e., hertz).
Elevations in both parameters typically results in increased exci-
tation of the reward-relevant neurons being stimulated, either
by increasing the number of neurons engaged by the stimula-
tion (amperes) (Keesey, 1962; Wise et al., 1992) or by increasing
the frequency in which a set population of neurons fire (hertz)
(Wise and Rompre, 1989; Wise, 2005). Manipulations of current
intensity alter the number of neurons activated, i.e., larger current
intensities affect a wider population of neurons than smaller cur-
rents. Thus, when this parameter is kept constant, the population
of neurons excited by EBS is relatively similar regardless of cur-
rent frequency. The stimulation parameter variable of choice for
these protocols is current frequency, as this selection allows us to
manipulate the firing rate of the same group of neurons withmin-
imal effects on the time or space of stimulation integration. By
manipulating these EBS parameters, we have developed sophisti-
cated models of cost/benefit decision-making that employ ICSS
(Rokosik and Napier, 2011, 2012; Tedford et al., 2012; Persons
et al., 2013). This application represents a radical departure from
the traditionally used reinforcing stimulus (i.e., food) in tasks
assessing decision-making in rodents. ICSS may provide several
experimental advantages over traditional reinforcement methods.
To facilitate operant responding for food, daily intake is often
restricted (Feja and Koch, 2014; Hosking et al., 2014;Mejia-Toiber
et al., 2014). This practice can confound outcome measures,
as there is substantial overlap in the neurobiological systems
that are altered during chronic food restriction and those that
mediate impulsive decision-making (Schuck-Paim et al., 2004;
Minamimoto et al., 2009). Additionally, animals reinforced with
food become increasingly satiated throughout a session, which
decreases the value of food reinforcement (Bizo et al., 1998),
although this effect may be dependent on reinforcer size (Roll
et al., 1995). In contrast to food reinforcement, the reinforcer
value of the EBS remains stable throughout a session, allowing
for more extensive and consistent behavioral assessments (Trowill
et al., 1969). This feature allows for testing sessions to occur
repeatedly throughout a day, which can be beneficial when study-
ing the effects of pharmacological therapies, specifically chronic
drug treatment. Our published probability discounting studies
(discussed below) were conducted several times a day throughout
chronic dopamine agonist (pramipexole) treatments. We propose
that this procedural benefit is more applicable to the human con-
dition and thus provides enhanced translational findings. To date,
similar studies assessing dopamine agonist effects on impulsive
decision-making using food reward have only assessed acute drug
treatments (St Onge and Floresco, 2009; Zeeb et al., 2009;Madden
et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2011; Koffarnus et al., 2011) and it
will be of significant interest to compare the behavioral outcomes
following both acute and chronic drug treatment between these
different reinforcers. While ICSS provides several advantages over
food reinforcement, ICSS also presents several disadvantages. For
example, ICSS requires invasive brain surgery and recovery, and
ill-fitted head stages can result in loss of subjects throughout the
behavioral paradigm. Despite these drawbacks, we hold that ICSS
is a viable alternative to food reinforcement and presents con-
siderable advantages to food reinforcement in these behavioral
tasks.
Cost/benefit decision-making tasks require choices to be made
between options associated with varying reward magnitudes.
Accordingly, reinforcers used in these tasks should demonstrate
the ability to produce such changes in reward magnitude and
subsequently rats must be able to discriminate between the small
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reinforcer (SR) and large reinforcer (LR) option. In procedures
that use food reinforcement, this is achieved by altering the
number of food pellets obtained after a response. In ICSS, the
EBS can be varied by changing stimulation current intensity
or current frequency. Figure 1 illustrates lever-press responding
obtained when current intensity is varied (i.e., current frequency
was held constant; Figure 1A) or when current frequency is var-
ied (i.e., current intensity was held constant; Figure 1B). When
FIGURE 1 | Effects of brain stimulation parameters on lever-press
responding and probability discounting. The two EBS parameters tested
were current intensity and current frequency. Rats lever pressed for EBS (in
a fixed ratio-1 schedule of reinforcement) wherein every 2min, one
parameter of EBS was manipulated and the other parameter was held
constant. (A) Manipulation of current intensity. Current intensities ranging
from 10 to 350µA were presented in randomized order (n = 6); current
frequency was held at 100Hz. (B) Manipulation of current frequency.
Current frequencies ranging from 5 to 140Hz were presented in
randomized order (n = 3); current intensity was held constant at a level that
was individualized and determined in prior training sessions. Manipulating
current intensity or current frequency produced similar patterns of
lever-press responding. Data are shown as mean ± s.e.m. for the last three
consecutive sessions. Rats were subsequently trained in the probability
discounting task and values for the small and large reinforcers were
determined individually for each animal by computing the effective
stimulation current intensities and current frequencies obtained from the
EBS vs. lever-press responding curve that elicited 60 and 90% of maximal
lever-press response rates, respectively. Varying the magnitude of current
intensity (C) or current frequency (D) resulted in discounting the large
reinforcer (LR) as the probability of delivery was decreased (i.e., decrease
in percent selection of the lever associated with the LR over total
selections). Data are shown as mean ± s.e.m. for day one of discounting
using current intensity and 2 days of discounting using current frequency.
Figure modified from Rokosik and Napier (2011) and reprinted with
permission from the publisher.
either parameter is altered, rats exhibit moderate lever pressing
for small EBS values and show increased lever-pressing rates
for large EBS values, suggesting that the reinforcer value of the
larger stimulation is greater (independent of whether current
intensity or frequency is manipulated). EBS can therefore be tai-
lored for the small and large reinforcer necessary for cost/benefit
decision-making protocols. These reinforcer values can be deter-
mined in individual rats by generating stable lever-pressing rate
response curves for each animal (Rokosik and Napier, 2011,
2012). Alternatively, a population curve can be generated from
a group of rats from which a standardized SR and LR value can be
determined (Tedford et al., 2012; Persons et al., 2013). This latter
approach provides a more time-efficient and yet reliable means
to derive the SR and LR. In a second series of studies, we used
either manipulations of current intensity or frequency to establish
SR/LR values in a probability discounting task (i.e., risk/reward
decision-making). Changes in current intensity reinforcer values
(i.e., current frequency was held constant) and current frequency
values (i.e., current intensity was held constant) both produce
significant discounting behavior in rats (Figures 1C,D). Based
in part on the steepness of the discounting curve, current fre-
quency was determined to be the appropriate parameter for
manipulating reinforcement values. Once it is established that
rats can distinguish between the standardized current frequen-
cies used for the SR and LR, they can be tested in any one of
our ICSS-mediated decision-making paradigms: (i) risk/reward
decision-making (Rokosik and Napier, 2011, 2012), (ii) delay-
based decision-making (Tedford et al., 2012), or (iii) effort-based
decision-making (Persons et al., 2013).
VALIDATING THE USE OF ICSS TO EVALUATE MEASURES OF
IMPULSIVITY AND DECISION-MAKING
The development of new animalmodels requires careful consider-
ation regarding validity. Thus, in designing these ICSS-mediated
decision-making tasks, we have strived to verify face and con-
struct validity, and to ascertain the likelihood for predictive
validity.
Face validity refers to the extent in which a test subjectively
appears to measure its intended phenomenon. The design of
each ICSS-mediated decision-making task was based on cur-
rent protocols employed in humans for delay and probability
discounting (Rasmussen et al., 2010; Leroi et al., 2013) and
other effort-based decision-making tasks (Treadway et al., 2009;
Buckholtz et al., 2010; Wardle et al., 2011). In humans, mea-
sures of cost/benefit decision-making are derived from asking
individuals to select between several options available with spe-
cific contingencies placed on each selection (i.e., risk, delay, or
effort). We emulate this scenario by presenting rats with two
simultaneously extended levers, wherein a selection of either lever
is associated with small or larger rewards that are also delivered
under particular parameters of contingency. Thus, each of our
ICSS-mediated decision-making tasks demonstrates face validity.
Construct validity refers to the ability of the paradigm to accu-
rately assess what it proposes to measure. In risk/reward and
delay-based decision-making, preference for the large reward is
decreased as the probability of delivery is lowered, or the delay
toward reward delivery is increased, respectively. In effort-based
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decision-making, individuals demonstrate initial preference for
the high effort/large reward option when the effort associated
with the large reward is deemed reasonable. A shift in preference
to the low effort/small reward is observed when the high effort
is no longer worth the energy expenditure. It is well-documented
that rodents exhibit similar patterns of risk/reward, delay-based
and effort-based decision making compared to humans (Rachlin
et al., 1991; Buelow and Suhr, 2009; Jimura et al., 2009), and we
have observed these profiles in each of our tasks (Rokosik and
Napier, 2011, 2012; Tedford et al., 2012; Persons et al., 2013) (for
example, see Figure 2).
Predictive validity refers to the ability of models to foresee
future relationships, and we pose that our models can be used
to predict the capacity of novel pharmacological treatments to
alter cost/benefit decision-making. That is, by demonstrating
proof-of-concept through replicating the effects of pharmaco-
logical agents on decision-making behaviors that have already
been established in humans, we propose that our models may
be efficacious in predicting how other drugs may mediate these
behaviors in the clinic. For example, a subset of patients with
Parkinson’s disease (PD) who are treated with dopamine ago-
nist therapies demonstrate an increased prevalence of gambling
behavior (Weintraub et al., 2010) and increased discounting in
delay-based decision-making (Housden et al., 2010; Milenkova
et al., 2011; Voon et al., 2011; Leroi et al., 2013; Szamosi et al.,
FIGURE 2 | Effects of pramipexole on risk/reward decision-making
using a probability discounting task. Chronic (±)PPX decreases
discounting in PD-like (A) and sham control (B) rats. Briefly describing the
task, PD-like (n = 11) and sham control (n = 10) rats were trained in the
probability discounting task using ICSS. Probabilities associated with
delivery of the large reinforcer (LR) were presented in a pseudo-randomized
order. Once stable behavior was observed, rats were treated chronically
with twice daily injections of 2mg/kg (±)PPX for 13 days. Data shown were
collected from the time point in which we observed the peak effect on the
final day of treatment (i.e., 6 h post injection) and are compared with the
pretreatment baseline (BL). Shown is the percent selection of the LR (i.e.,
free-choice ratio) vs. the probability that the LR was delivered. A Two-Way
rmANOVA with post hoc Newman-Keuls revealed significant increases in %
selection of the uncertain, LR following chronic PPX treatment (∗p < 0.05)
for both PD-like and sham rat groups. Although the group averages indicate
a PPX-induced increase in suboptimal risk/reward decision-making, two rats
in each group showed less than a 20% increase from baseline at the lowest
probability tested; therefore, some rats appeared to be insensitive to the
ability of the drug to modify probability discounting. Figure modified from
Rokosik and Napier (2012) and reprinted with permission from the publisher.
2013). Thus, our laboratory set out to model PD in rats and study
the effects of pramipexole, a commonly employed dopamine
agonist associated with gambling behaviors (Weintraub et al.,
2010), on cost/benefit decision-making in the rat using the prob-
ability discounting task (risk/reward decision-making) (Rokosik
and Napier, 2012). To do so, rats were rendered “PD-like” by
selective lesioning of dopaminergic terminals within the dorso-
lateral striatum via bilateral infusions of 6-OHDA, while control
rats received infusions of the 6-OHDA vehicle (Rokosik and
Napier, 2012). Neurons in the dorsolateral striatum of only the
6-OHDA treated rats show a decrease in tyrosine hydroxylase
(Rokosik and Napier, 2012), a marker of dopamine. PD-like rats
exhibit motor disturbances similar to humans with early-stage
PD, which can be reversed dose-dependently with pramipexole
treatment. The dose of pramipexole we administered to study
risk/reward decision-making alleviates motor deficits, and thus
is therapeutically-relevant (Rokosik and Napier, 2012). While we
find no difference in baseline “risky” behavior between control
rats and PD-like rats, chronic pramipexole treatment increases
selection of the risky LR in both groups of rats when prob-
abilities of delivery were small (Figures 2A,B), indicating that
pramipexole induces suboptimal risk/reward decision-making.
These data concur with studies that have assessed the effects of
pramipexole in humans (Spengos et al., 2006; Pizzagalli et al.,
2008; Riba et al., 2008). Nonetheless, we infer the predictive
validity of our rodent models in indicating other pharmaco-
logical agents that may mediate cost/benefit decision-making in
humans.
We also have tested mirtazapine, an atypical anti-depressant,
in the effort-based decision-making task. Behavioral addic-
tions and substance abuse share many overlapping characteris-
tics, including suboptimal decision-making, and new studies in
humans and non-human animals illustrate that mirtazapine is
effective at reducing behaviors motivated by abused drugs (e.g.,
opiates and psychostimulants) even those that are associated
with relapse during periods of abstinence (for review, see Graves
et al., 2012). Data collected from our ICSS-mediated effort-
based decision-making task indicates that mirtazapine effectively
reduced preference for a high effort/LR, switching to a low
effort/SR, suggesting that the amount of effort required for the LR
was no longer “worth it,” or that the reward value of the LR was
diminished (Persons et al., 2013). These results suggest that it may
be of interest to study the effects of mirtazapine on suboptimal
decision-making in problem gamblers in the clinic.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we have utilized ICSS as a positive reinforcer in sev-
eral novel tasks designed to measure separate, yet overlapping,
aspects of cost/benefit decision-making exhibited in problem
gambling. These measures can be used to further explore the
contribution of various neuroanatomical substrates and neuro-
transmitter systems in problem gambling. ICSS-mediated tasks
provide a viable alternative to food reinforcement in these com-
plex operant paradigms. We believe that the validity of these tasks
indicates that they can aid in screening drugs for their potential to
induce impulse control disorders, such as problem gambling, and
to help identify drugs that reduce these disorders.
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